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Theo A. F. Kuipers 
A BRAND NEW TYPE OF INDUCTIVE LOGIC 
REPLY TO DIDERIK BATENS 
The correspondence to which Diderik Batens refers dates from the autumn of 
1971, and resulted in my very first publication in English, albeit a very short one 
(Kuipers 1972). Ever since, he has been for me one of the few role models as a 
philosopher trying to bridge the gap between logic and philosophy of science. 
Although he certainly is much more of a logician than I am, in many cases, as in 
the present one, he remains driven by questions stemming from philosophy of 
science. I am not the only Dutch speaking philosopher influenced by this role 
model. In Belgium, notably Ghent, he shaped the interests of Jean Paul Van 
Bendegem, Erik Weber, Helena de Preester and Joke Meheus, to mention only 
those who have contributed to one of the present two volumes. Certainly the 
great example in the Netherlands is Evert Willem Beth. Unfortunately I was too 
young to ever meet him. Although Beth exerted a powerful influence on a whole 
generation of Dutch philosophers, their emphasis was even more on 
(mathematical or philosophical) logic and, later, its computational and linguistic 
applications. Happily enough, Hans Mooij is one of the few exceptions. He was 
the first supervisor of my dissertation and has now contributed to the present 
volume. At one time, Johan van Benthem, Beth’s indirect successor, seemed to 
become the great example from and for my own generation. However, after his 
review-like programmatic paper “The logical study of science” (Van Benthem, 
1982) on general philosophy of science, he, unfortunately for my field, directed 
his logical skills to other areas. But times seem to change, witness his 
contribution to the present volume. 
Batens’ contribution is a typical example of doing logic in the service of 
philosophy of science. Since his contribution is already an impressive logical 
system, it may be seen as the idealized point of departure for a really rich logic 
of induction and so I would like to focus my reply on some points that may be 
relevant for further concretization. However, before doing that, I would like to 
situate Batens’ project in the realm of different approaches to inductive logic. 
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Kinds of Inductive Logic 
It is interesting to see how Batens deviates from the old approaches to a logic of 
induction or an inductive logic. Basically, I mean the two approaches initiated 
by Carnap, the first being based on the idea of first assigning degrees of 
inductive probability to hypotheses, prior and posterior relative to the evidence, 
and then basing rules of inference on them that avoid paradoxes, notably the 
lottery paradox. Hintikka and Hilpinen made serious progress along these lines, 
although at the price of assigning non-zero prior probabilities to genuine 
generalizations. Carnap was not willing to pay this price, which makes him a 
dogmatic skeptic, to use Niiniluoto’s (1999) apt phrase for this attitude. Be that 
as it may, Carnap made the decision-theoretic move by restricting the task of 
inductive logic to the probability assignments to be used in decisions, taking 
relevant utilities into account. As can be derived from Ch. 4 of ICR, even this 
restricted program of inductive logic, despite its dogmatic skeptic nature, was 
certainly successful, internally and externally, falsifying Lakatos’ premature 
claim that it was a degenerating program. 
It is true that the general idea of an “inductive logic” has several other 
elaborations. Bayesian philosophy of science is sometimes described this way. 
As a matter of fact, its standard version can be seen as one of the three basic 
approaches in the second sense indicated above (see Section 4 of the Synopsis of 
ICR, and more extensively, SiS, Section 7.1.2), viz. the one rejecting dogmatic 
skepticism, that is, by taking “inductive priors” into account, but also rejecting 
“inductive (or adaptive) likelihoods.” Carnap, in contrast, rejected inductive 
priors in favor of inductive likelihoods. Finally, Hintikka has chosen the “double 
inductive” approach, that is, inductive priors and inductive likelihoods. The 
common feature of these three approaches is that they aim at realizing the 
property of instantial confirmation or positive instantial relevance: another 
occurrence of a certain outcome increases its probability for the next trial. 
Besides these (restricted or unrestricted) probabilistic approaches to 
inductive logic, there are a number of totally different approaches. Besides that 
of Batens, three of them should be mentioned, all of a computational nature. The 
first one is that of Thagard c.s. (Holland et al 1986, Thagard 1988), leading to 
the computer program PI (Processes of Induction). The second operates under 
the heading of “inductive logic programming” (see Flach and Kakas 2000) and 
the third under “abductive logic programming” (see Kakas et al 1998). Whereas 
the first is not so much logically inspired, but connectionistic, the other two 
typically are. Batens’ approach is, at least so far, a purely logical one and hence 
is rightly called a “logic of induction.” It is a specialization of his own adaptive 
version of dynamic logic aiming at deriving (inductive) generalizations of the 
type: for all x, if Ax then Bx.
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Points for Concretization 
I shall not concentrate on technical matters regarding Batens’ logic of induction. 
Although it is presented in a very transparent way by first giving a more 
informal description of the main means and ends, I do not want to suggest that I 
have grasped all the details. Incidentally, readers will find in Meheus’ paper 
another nice entry into adaptive logic. Although Batens writes of modifications 
rather than concretizations, his contribution, like several others, nicely 
illustrates that not only the sciences but also philosophy can profit greatly from 
the idealization & concretization (I&C) strategy.1 I shall concentrate on some 
points of concretization that are desirable from the point of view of philosophy 
of science.
A first point is the restriction to generalizations not referring to individual 
constants. In my opinion Batens defends this idealization in Section 3 too 
strongly by referring  as such correctly  to the history of the laws of Galileo 
and Kepler according to which the reference to the earth and the sun, 
respectively, disappeared in a way in light of Newton’s theory (see also his 
Notes 9 and 10). Typically of inductive methods, rather than 
hypothetico-deductive ones, I would suggest that in particular in the heuristic 
phase of inductive research programs (see ICR, 7.5.4) reference to individual 
objects seems very normal. Indeed, the work of Galileo and Kepler may well be 
seen from this perspective, whereas Newton indeed saw earth and sun merely as 
objects of a kind. Moreover, in many areas, e.g. in the humanities, many (quasi-) 
generalizations seem only to make sense when linked to individuals. More 
precisely, dispositions of human beings are frequently bound to one individual. 
People may have more or less unique habits. Hence, a realistic logic of induction 
should be able to deal with generalizations that merely hold for individual 
objects. Happily enough, Batens claims, also in his Note 9, that it is at least 
possible to reduce the effect of the relevant restriction to zero.
A second possible concretization is leaving room for falsified background 
knowledge. In Note 11 Batens explains that it would be possible to do so by 
moving to paraconsistent logic. To be sure, Batens is the leading European 
scholar is this enterprise. Although his formulation might suggest otherwise, I 
am fairly sure that he does not want to suggest that this paraconsistent move 
                                                          
1 In Kuipers (forthcoming) I illustrate this conceptual version of I&C, as a variant of the empirical 
version, in terms of the theory of (confirmation, empirical progress, and) truth approximation 
presented in ICR. In this illustration the two versions of I&C meet each other: revised truth 
approximation is a conceptual concretization of basic truth approximation, accounting for empirical 
concretization, e.g. the transition from the ideal gas law to the law of Van der Waals.
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requires a complete departure from the present adaptive dynamic approach. 
What is at stake here seems to be a matter of the order of concretization. The 
concretization to paraconsistent adaptive logic is a general concretization of that 
logic, not specifically related to inductive ends. Hence, the question that 
intrigues me is how important the concretization to paraconsistency is from my 
philosophy of science point of view. In this respect it is important to note first 
that I fully subscribe to Batens’ first sentence of Note 11: “Scientists may 
justifiedly stick to hypothetical knowledge that is falsified by the empirical data, 
for example because no non-falsified theory is available.” (p. 203) In a way, this 
sentence could be seen as the main point of departure of ICR. However, ICR 
develops an explication of this observation that, at least at first sight, completely 
differs from the paraconsistent move. In this respect it may be interesting to note 
that paraconsistent logic is still very much “truth/falsity” oriented, whereas ICR 
is basically “empirical progress and truth approximation” oriented. (See ICR, 
Ch. 1, for this distinction.) The strange thing, however, is that although “being 
falsified” of a theory becomes from my perspective a meaningful but 
non-dramatic event for a theory, the falsification of a hypothetical inductive 
generalization (or a first order observational induction, ICR, p. 65) is a crucial 
event. Since the data at a certain moment (t) are composed of (partial) 
descriptions of realized possibilities R(t) and inductive generalizations based on 
them, summarized by S(t), a falsification of one of the latter means that the 
“correct data” assumption is no longer valid. In other words, we have to weaken 
S(t) in a sufficient way, preferably such that it is just sufficient. Note that this not 
a concretization move. Note moreover, that it not only holds for the basic 
approach but also for the refined approach (ICR, Ch. 10). To be sure, one may 
argue in particular that taking falsifications of S(t) into account in some 
sophisticated way might further concretize the refined approach. However, I 
submit that scientists will be more inclined to adapt S(t) as suggested. Hence, 
from my point of view, the concretization to paraconsistency is not particularly 
urgent or even relevant for the role of inductive generalizations in aiming at 
empirical progress and truth approximation. This attitude seems to be supported 
by Batens and Haestert (forthcoming) where they extend and improve upon 
Batens’ present contribution. Of course, when genuinely inconsistent theories 
are at stake the paraconsistent move may become unavoidable. 
Another possibility for concretization intrigues me very much. Batens 
argues at the beginning of Section 6 that it becomes relevant to search for 
confirming and falsifying instances of “for all x if A(x) then B(x)” of the type 
A(x) & B(x) and, of course, A(x) & non-B(x), respectively. Although he refers in 
Note 25 to qualitative confirmation in the sense of Ch. 2 of ICR, it remains 
unclear whether my analysis of kinds of non-falsifying instances in terms of two 
types of confirming instances (A(x) & B(x) and non-A(x) & non-B(x)) and one 
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type of neutral instances (non-A(x) & B(x)) plays any role. More specifically, 
from that perspective one would expect, in line with general dynamic logic 
intuitions, that one starts either with A-cases, and finds out whether they are B or 
non-B, or with non-B-cases, and find out whether they are A or non-A. All this in 
order to avoid searching for neutral cases. If I am right that this selective search 
does not yet play a role, a concretization in this direction would certainly lead to 
a more realistic and more efficient logic.2
Let me conclude with a point that has nothing to do with concretization, but 
that puzzles me a lot. Although I think I can follow why (†) holds in the logic, I 
do not understand why it is a “simple and intuitive fact” (p. 214) of which it is 
“unlikely that [it] will be discovered if one does not handle induction in terms of 
logic.” The combination seems implausible, but knowing Batens, he must have 
something serious in mind. 
REFERENCES
Batens, D. and L. Haesert (forthcoming). On Classical Adaptive Logics of Induction. Forthcoming 
in Logique et Analyse.
Benthem, J. van (1982). The Logical Study of Science. Synthese 51, 431-472. 
Flach, P.A. and A.C. Kakas, eds. (2000). Abduction and Induction. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic
Publishers. 
Holland, J., K. Holyoak, R. Nisbett and P. Thagard (1986). Induction. Processes of Inference, 
Learning and Discovery. Cambridge MA: The MIT Press. 
Kakas, A., R. Kowalski and F. Toni (1998). The Role of Abduction in Logic Programming. In:        
D. Gabbay, C. Hogger, and J. Robinson (eds.), Handbook of Logic in Artificial Intelligence and 
Logic Programming, vol. 5, pp. 235-324. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kuipers, T. (1972). A Note on Confirmation. Philosophica Gandensia 10, 76-77. 
Kuipers, T. (forthcoming). Empirical and Conceptual Idealization and Concretization. The Case of
Truth Approximation. Forthcoming in (English and Polish editions of) Liber Amicorum for 
Leszek Nowak. 
Niiniluoto, I. (1999). Critical Scientific Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Thagard, P. (1988). Computational Philosophy of Science. Cambridge MA: The MIT Press. 
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